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2 
Introduction 
 
…[Alice] went on. “Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?”  
“That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,” said the Cat.1 
 
 In Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals,2 the Supreme Court ruled that judges 
are the gatekeepers of scientific evidence, thereby bringing the debate about economic 
methodology to the bench. Debate about the admissibility of scientific evidence, 
contentious even in the natural sciences, is amplified if the discipline incorporates 
numerous methodological approaches. In this paper, I will consider three different 
approaches to economic questions—theory, experiment, and econometrics—and examine 
how a judge can evaluate these approaches as evidence in the courtroom. The expansion of 
economic reasoning in law means that this question needs to be answered in a number of 
areas of law, but to give a thorough examination of the different methodological 
approaches, this paper will limit discussion to economic evidence in tying law. 
 An examination of economic methodology in law is distinct from discussions of 
general economic methodology for a number of reasons. First, while methodological 
eclecticism may be acceptable within academia, the use of different methodologies is 
incompatible in the courtroom. As shown in Part II, the three approaches considered in this 
paper often produce different conclusions. A judge, therefore, cannot give each approach 
equal weight; in order to reach a conclusion, the judge will need to prefer one type of 
evidence over the others. Second, although academia can tolerate methodological pluralism, 
conclusiveness is essential in law. The need for finality in judicial rulings means that a 
judge cannot wait for further research before ruling in a case: the tying arrangement must 
either be condoned or condemned. In sum, judges are required to make decisions about 
what constitutes economic evidence in tying cases. This paper will examine that decision in 
order to understand how judges can evaluate different types of economic evidence.  
 In Part I, I will explain what judges are considering when ruling on tying cases, and 
why economics is useful in tying law. The purpose of establishing a philosophical 
framework in Part I is to provide a starting point from which judges can consider the 
different methodological approaches. Part II details the three different methodological 
approaches, explaining why they are distinct from one another and how they apply to tying 
law. In Part III and Part IV, I present my conclusions about the preferable methodological 
approach. Part III argues that theoretical evidence is inappropriate in tying law, drawing 
both on the current legal standards for scientific evidence and a defense of empiricism in 
science. Finally, in Part IV, I argue that, in tying cases, econometric evidence is more 
externally valid than experimental evidence, thereby completing a rationale for judges to 
choose among these three approaches to economic evidence in tying law. 
                                                
1 Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland, 66 (Dover Publications, Inc. 1993). 
2 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmeceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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I. Consequentialism in Law & Economics 
 
There is another powerful and great cause of the little advancement of the sciences, which is this: it 
is impossible to advance properly in the course when the goal is not properly fixed. 
-Sir Francis Bacon3 
 
In order to examine how judges make their decisions in tying cases, it is necessary 
to understand the statutes that regulate tying, as well as how the courts have applied these 
statutes over the past century. As with most antitrust laws, the Sherman Act and the Clayton 
Act are the two main statutes concerning tying. Section 3 of the Clayton Act applies only to 
the tying of commodities, so any cases involving tied services must be brought under 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.4 The term bundling is closely related to tying, but bundling 
refers to the sale of goods or services in fixed proportions. Bundling, therefore, is a subset 
of tying. Although tying and bundling are different terms, the distinction is unimportant in 
this paper. The terms have also been used interchangeably by the courts on some 
occasions.5 
The way courts have handled tying cases has changed considerably since the early 
20th century. This change is especially important because the creation of antitrust legal 
theory is largely a product of the courts, not the legislatures.6 In the first half of the century, 
judges generally ruled that tying arrangements were per se illegal, meaning that “their 
pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively 
presumed to be unreasonable.”7 Under the classic leverage theory, tying was considered a 
way for firms with considerable market power to block the entry of new competitors, or for 
firms to leverage their power from one market to another.8 This reasoning came under 
scrutiny beginning in the 1950s, when economists and lawyers began applying economic 
theory to tying cases. Using the lens of price theory “led the economists and lawyers of the 
‘Chicago School’ to the view that there is no economic basis for concern with the 
exclusionary practices [bundling and tying].”9 Advocates of the Chicago School approach 
argued that tying allows firms to price discriminate or lower production costs, both of 
which benefit consumers. 
By the mid-1980s, the Supreme Court was using the rule of reason, not the per se 
rule, to evaluate tying cases. Using the rule of reason, tying arrangements must be proven to 
unreasonably restrain trade in order to warrant intervention. “[W]hile the Court has spoken 
                                                
3 Francis Bacon, Novum Organum, I, 80. Cited in Mortimer J. Adler and Charles van Doren (ed.), Great 
Treasury of Western Thought, 1110 (R.R. Bowker Company, 1977). 
4 The American Bar Association: Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law and Economics of Product 
Distribution, 217 (American Bar Association, 2006). 
5 Alden F. Abbott and Joshua D. Wright, “Antitrust Analysis of Tying Arrangements and Exclusive 
Dealing,” 3, in Keith N. Hylton, (ed.), Antitrust Law and Economics (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010). 
6 Robert Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself, 72 (Free Press, 1993). 
7 Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5. Cited in Wright, 3. 
8 The American Bar Association, Antitrust Law and Economics of Product Distribution, 190. 
9 Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law, 6 (University of Chicago Press, 1978). 
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of a ‘per se’ rule against tying arrangements, it has also recognized that tying may have pro-
competitive justifications that make it inappropriate to condemn without considerable 
market analysis.”10 This newly established emphasis on thorough market analysis is another 
reason why this paper’s evaluation of economic evidence is necessary. The courts have 
made it clear that rulings in tying cases should be based on sound economic evidence, but, 
as this paper will show, economic evidence is not uniform. Theoretical, experimental, and 
empirical research have different methodologies and distinct advantages, so a careful 
evaluation of economic evidence is essential for effective rulings in tying cases. 
 An examination of the judicial decision-making process is essential before choosing 
among the different types of economic evidence. This process can be analyzed by 
answering two simple questions: 1) what is a judge’s objective? and 2) how can a judge best 
achieve that objective? While these questions about the adjudication process apply to any 
area of law, they are especially relevant to tying cases, because antitrust law is inordinately 
affected by the judiciary. Judge Richard Posner argues, “American antitrust law is far more 
the creation of judicial decisions than of antitrust legislation: the most important antitrust 
laws are as skimpy and vague as most provisions of the Bill of Rights. We ought therefore 
to be interested in how antitrust law has been shaped by the motivations, constraints, and 
other influences that play on judges.”11 Because the judiciary has largely created and 
applied antitrust law, this paper will focus on how tying cases are handled by the judges, 
with little reference to legislatures. 
Before evaluating the three types of economic evidence, I need to defend an answer 
to the two questions about judicial decision-making. First, judges should adhere to “legal 
pragmatism” with regard to antitrust law, meaning that a judge’s objective is to create the 
best consequences with every ruling. Second, judges should be “instrumentalists” when 
they reference economics in the courtroom, meaning that economics should be used as a 
tool to create good outcomes. These two approaches—legal pragmatism and 
instrumentalism—are closely related, so that there is consistent answer to the two main 
questions about the adjudication process.12 Together, they constitute a consequentialist 
framework, meaning that they evaluate choices based on the consequences of the choices in 
question. 
 
A. Legal Pragmatism 
 
Put simply, legal pragmatism means that a judge is more focused on the future than 
on the past. A legal pragmatist’s ruling will be designed to generate the best 
consequences—weighing both short-term and long-term effects—which may or may not be 
                                                
10 National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 
85, 104 n.26 (1984). Cited in Wright, 4. 
11 Posner, How Judges Think, 5 (Harvard University Press, 2008). 
12 Legal pragmatism is closely related to an instrumental interpretation of law. 
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consistent with judicial precedent or legislative statutes. “’[P]ragmatist judges always try to 
do the best they can do for the present and the future, unchecked by any felt duty to secure 
consistency in principle with what other officials have done in the past.’”13 Legal 
pragmatism, therefore, sees judges as less mechanical than other types of jurisprudence. 
Judges cannot simply apply the law in many cases—often the statute is unclear or past 
rulings had undesirable consequences—so a pragmatic judge is more willing to 
acknowledge the need for a judicial intervention. Legal pragmatism can also be understood 
by contrasting it with legal formalism, which posits that rulings can be based on a priori 
rules and logical reasoning, while maintaining a commitment to precedent.14 Legal 
formalism—associated with the idea that judges should apply law and not make it—may in 
fact be closer to the average citizen’s conception of an objective, independent judiciary. As 
Judge Posner notes, “Formalism is the official jurisprudence of lawyers and laypeople 
alike.”15 Given this tension between legal pragmatism and legal formalism, why should 
judges prefer pragmatism?  
Within the scope of tying law, there are three reasons to prefer legal pragmatism. 
First, the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act were not based on modern economic reasoning. 
Robert Bork writes, “What is true is that our ideas are old; they carry whatever credentials 
time alone can confer. The years 1890 to 1914 witnessed the origin of every major theory 
that drives and directs the evolution of antitrust doctrine to this day…But it is not true, as 
we trustingly assume, that these ideas were ever demonstrated theoretically or confirmed 
empirically.”16 A thorough legislative history is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is 
clear that economics as a discipline was just emerging when the statutes were written. For 
example, the Sherman Act was passed in 1890, the same year that Alfred Marshall’s 
Principles of Economics was first published. Given this paper’s subject matter, it is also 
important to note that Edward Chamberlain did not conduct the first economic experiments 
until 1948, and econometric techniques were not firmly established until the 1940s.17  
Given such inauspicious origins, the antitrust statutes are best handled by legal 
pragmatism, because attempts to apply the statutes according to their original intent would 
be counterproductive; such formalism may harm both consumers and producers. This is 
especially true for tying cases, because the statutes and judicial precedent exhibit a 
“historical distrust of tying arrangements.”18 Judges, and even economists, had a limited 
knowledge about the effect of tying in the late 19th century and early 20th century. The 
development of tying within academia, from the classic leverage theory to the Chicago 
                                                
13 Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 241 (Belknap Press of Harvard University, 
2002). 
14 Originalism, a jurisprudence often associated with Justice Antonin Scalia and former Judge Robert 
Bork, is a type of formalism that emphasizes a literal interpretation of the law based on its original intent. 
15 Louis Menand, (ed.), Pragmatism: A Reader, 419 (Vintage Books, 1997). 
16 Bork, 16. 
17 Mary S. Morgan, The History of Econometric Ideas, 2 (Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
18 Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1288 (2006). 
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School and beyond, demonstrates a flaw with legal formalism: simply applying the statutes 
limits judges to a static level of knowledge. The inevitability of change within a discipline, 
not only in economics, but also the natural sciences, is well-established.19 Since our 
knowledge about the effects of tying will almost certainly change, it is essential to endorse a 
jurisprudence that can incorporate such change. Legal pragmatism allows judges to include 
incorporate the dynamism of scientific progress, which will improve the efficacy of judicial 
rulings. 
The second reason to prefer legal pragmatism in tying cases is that the antitrust 
statutes require significant interpretation. Ambiguous legislation cannot simply be applied, 
so it is best to acknowledge that a judge must act as lawmaker in tying cases. “Even in 
statutory fields of law, courts have obligations other than the mechanical translation of 
legislative will, and these obligations are particularly important with statutes as open-
textured as the antitrust laws.”20 The ambiguity of the antitrust statutes require significant 
judicial interpretation, maybe to the point of considering the judge a lawmaker, all of which 
is consistent with legal pragmatism. 
The third reason to prefer legal pragmatism is that, within the scope of tying law, it 
avoids the fundamental criticism of legal pragmatism and consequentialism in general. The 
major objection to legal pragmatism is that it will lead to inconsistent, arbitrary rulings 
because there is no consensus about the best outcome in a case. While this may be a valid 
criticism for legal pragmatism in other areas of law, this critique does not apply to tying 
law. As antitrust law became more grounded in economics in the second half of the 20th 
century, allocative efficiency became the goal of antitrust laws.21  
This unanimity about maximizing allocative efficiency, however, does not mean 
that judges can act as machines. Although judges agree about the goal, and although they 
agree about the legal test (e.g. using the rule of reason) there is still “no single analytical 
approach followed by the courts in applying the rule of reason to tying claims.”22 Having 
allocative efficiency as a goal, however, does allow judges to avoid the difficult issue of 
disputing best outcomes. Given the scope of this paper, legal pragmatism also has a fourth 
advantage: an economist can examine a legal issue like tying without becoming entangled 
with the type of thorough legal research that legal formalism demands.23  
                                                
19 See Part III, Section B. Cited in note 115. 
20 Bork, 72. 
21 Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 229. The distinction between allocative 
efficiency and consumer welfare as the goal of antitrust laws is important, though not for this paper. What 
matters is that there is a large degree of consensus about judicial goals in tying cases. For further reading 
on allocative efficiency, see Dennis W. Carlton, “Does Antitrust Need to Be Modernized,” The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 21, No. 3, 156 and Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EC Competition Law, 3 
(Oxford University Press, 2008). For reading on consumer welfare, see Bork, 7, and Geoffrey A. Manne 
and Joshua D. Wright, “A First Principles Approach to Antitrust Enforcement in the Agricultural 
Industry,” The CPI Antitrust Journal, April 2010, 3. 
22 The American Bar Association, Antitrust Law and Econoomics of Product Distribution, 218. 
23 This is not to say that a pragmatic judge needs no legal training. But if the effects of tying are the main 
concern, then the subject can be reasonably explored without extensive historical research. 
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Even in recent tying decisions, it is clear that there is tension between legal 
formalism and legal pragmatism. While judges continue to formally label tying practices as 
per se illegal, the courts’ rulings are often based on the rule of reason.24 This shows that 
judges feel compelled to acknowledge precedent, yet understand that precedent may 
produce undesirable outcomes. Before evaluating economic evidence, judges must have 
some idea about why such evidence is useful and understand they are trying to acheive. 
This paper defends using legal pragmatism in tying cases because legal pragmatism is 
concerned with predictions, not precedent. This focus on prediction is also a central tenet of 
economic instrumentalism which is the approach that answers the second main question: 
how can a judge pursue the goal of maximizing allocative efficiency?  
 
B. Economic Instrumentalism 
 
The conflict between instrumentalism and realism is common in both law and 
economics. In this paper, I will limit this extensive debate by looking only at how the 
discussion applies to judges in tying cases. I will argue that a judge should use economics 
when ruling on a tying case because economics is a useful tool for understanding the 
consequences of tying arrangements. Although a judicial ruling—whether condemning or 
permitting tying—is assured in every case, each ruling is based on the predicted effects of 
the tying practice in question. A judge deals with this uncertainty by using economic 
evidence as a predictive instrument for measuring expected allocative efficiency. 
Instrumentalism means that ideas are used as tools for problem solving. “[T]heories 
are neither true nor false (instruments are not true or false) but more or less adequate, given 
a particular problem.”25 As with legal pragmatism, it is also useful to define 
instrumentalism through contrast. Instrumentalists are unconcerned with whether theories 
correspond to reality, while scientific realists argue that true theories match objective 
reality. That is, realists argue that theories are more than useful tools; theories describe how 
the world actually works. Realists, therefore, set a higher standard for economic evidence. 
“[I]f we wish our theories to be true as well as predictively adequate, we cannot rely solely 
on predictive adequacy for evaluating them.”26 Realists are also more likely to demand that 
economic evidence have both explanatory and predictive power. 
While economic instrumentalism is common, most notably articulated by Milton 
Friedman in “The Methodology of Positive Economics,”27 it has also been heavily 
                                                
24 Wright, 3. 
25 Bruce Caldwell, Beyond Positivism: Economic Methodology in the Twentieth Century, 178 (Routledge, 
1994). 
26 Caldwell, 182. 
27 Although Friedman did not use the term “instrumentalist,” he agreed with such a characterization of his 
article. See Caldwell, 178. Not surprisingly, Friedman’s views are also propounded by two of the leading 
antitrust scholars from the University of Chicago: see Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of the Law 
(Aspen Publishers, 1998), and Robert Bork, The Antitrust Paradox. 
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criticized.28 For the purpose of this paper, the most relevant criticism concerns Friedman’s 
emphasis on predictive accuracy. Bruce Caldwell argues, “Philosophers of science since the 
1940s have been unanimous in their rejection of the notion that the only goal of science is 
prediction.”29 Caldwell also notes, however, that instrumentalism is a viable approach in 
cases where prediction is the primary goal.30 To defend instrumentalism in tying law, 
therefore, I only need to show that judges are concerned with predictions, not explanations.  
Since there is widespread agreement that antitrust judges should try to maximize 
allocative efficiency, judges are expected to make predictions—not explanations—about the 
effects of tying arrangements. Instrumentalism, though unfit for all economists, is still the 
best philosophy for judges in tying cases. In this way, my claim is less ambitious than 
Friedman’s: instead of arguing that instrumentalism is the correct approach for economists 
in general, I am arguing that instrumentalism is the correct lens through which judges 
should view economic evidence in tying cases. 
Judges should adhere to instrumentalism because it satisfies a judge’s needs without 
overreaching. Judges should not care whether economic evidence is an accurate 
representation of reality; they should care whether the evidence provides good predictions 
about the tying arrangement. The law, like an economic model, can be treated like a black 
box: as long as it generates good outcomes, it is a reliable tool. In tying cases, an 
instrumental judge will evaluate the economic evidence based on how useful it is. Since the 
goal of antitrust law is to maximize allocative efficiency, this means preferring the type of 
evidence that makes the best predictions about the effects of tying. This does not curtail the 
scope of economics as a discipline and does not mean that economists cannot be concerned 
with explanation. But within the legal system, promoting realism or demanding explanation 
is unnecessary. It is better for a judge to focus on generating good outcomes; seeking 
explanation and contemplating realism is better left to academia. 
Before evaluating theoretical, experimental, and econometric evidence, it is 
essential to establish a framework by which a judge can evaluate these three approaches. 
Establishing a philosophical framework is essential because it determines how a judge will 
evaluate different types of economic evidence. These two philosophies—legal pragmatism 
and economic instrumentalism—establish a consequentialist framework, meaning that 
judges are concerned about economic and legal consequences when evaluating different 
types of economic evidence. Fortunately, antitrust is an area of the law that lends itself to 
two compatible philosophies. Despite its dubious legislative origins, legal pragmatism and 
instrumentalism have helped antitrust law become “a success story of which all branches of 
                                                
28 Caldwell notes that Friedman’s essay, “has been reviewed often, usually negatively.” (178). Daniel 
Hausman, a philosopher of science, argues, “One finds in Friedman’s essay splendid apologetics that, 
with a bit of confusion, can masquerade as up-to-date respectable quasi-positivist philosophy of science.” 
29 Caldwell, 179. 
30 Caldwell, 186. 
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the law and allied disciplines can be proud.”31 Having established this framework, then, we 
can now evaluate theoretical, experimental, and empirical evidence in tying cases.  
 
II. The Three Approaches 
 
You know my methods, Watson. There was not one of them which I did not apply to the inquiry. 
-Sherlock Holmes32 
A. Theoretical Evidence 
 
 By theoretical evidence, I mean evidence based on purely theoretical or a priori 
knowledge;33 that is, evidence that is completely independent of experience or observation. 
Think of theoretical evidence as armchair theorizing; the problem is conceived, analyzed, 
and solved without observation or reference to the empirical world. Pure theorists believe 
that economists can only understand economic problems by relying on a priori knowledge. 
For example, Ludwig von Mises argues, “In all of its branches, [economics] is a priori, not 
empirical. Like logic and mathematics, it is not derived from experience; it is prior to 
experience.”34 
Theoretical evidence can also be understood by contrasting it with empirical 
evidence, which is based on a posteriori knowledge. Empirical knowledge is based on 
experience, and, therefore, it changes with observations of the physical world. In this sense 
of the term, both experimental economics and econometrics are empirical evidence, because 
their conclusions rely on observational data. 
Theoretical evidence, as I have defined it, encapsulates a diverse range of 
economists. In the context of tying, however, there are two main approaches that require 
examination: praxeology and rational choice theory. Although praxeologists and rational 
choice theorists draw conclusions from purely theoretical evidence, both their fundamental 
assumptions and methodologies differ significantly. 
 
1. Praxeology 
 
Praxeology (Greek for “the study of human action”) is most closely associated with 
the Austrian School of economics.35 There are three key aspects of praxeology: 1) an 
acceptance of universally true premises, 2) an insistence on verbal logical deduction, and 3) 
a rejection of empirical testing. As Murray Rothbard describes it, praxeology “builds a 
system of logical deduction on a few universally-known axioms, and which therefore 
                                                
31 Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 229. 
32 Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, The Memoirs of Sherlock Holmes, 416 (Doubleday). 
33 In this paper, the terms “theoretical” and “a priori” will be used interchangeably. 
34 Ludwig von Mises, Epistemological Problems of Economics, 12-13 (William Volker Fund, 1960). 
35 Because some Austrian economists, notably Friedrich Hayek, disapproved of the type of radical a 
priorism associated with praxeology, I will confine my arguments to praxeology and not the Austrian 
School in general. 
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arrives by verbal logic at a system of apodictic, absolutely know, truths.”36 Given that 
praxeology is a foreign methodology for most students of economics, it will be useful to 
describe how praxeologists draw conclusions about economic problems. 
The starting point of praxeology is a single universal truth: the axiom of human 
action. By human action, praxeologists mean that all conscious behavior is purposefully 
directed at some goal. Praxeologists are quick to note that they make no value judgments 
about the content of the goal or about the actions taken to reach the goal.37  
Two additional points of clarification are necessary. First, praxeologists are only 
concerned about conscious human action. Purely reflexive, instinctual behavior, is ignored, 
because the economic actor does not consciously direct such behavior toward his goal.38 
Second, praxeologists argue that purposeful human action is not the same as rationality, 
especially as that term is understood in neoclassical economics. Human action may be both 
irrational and purposeful, for example if the action is ill-conceived or unwise. Also note that 
because human action is known a priori, it cannot be contradicted by empirical observation. 
Any results claiming to undermine rationality, namely by psychologists or behavioral 
economists, do not concern a praxeologist. 
Rothbard argues that praxeology is simply working out the logical implications of 
the fundamental axiom of human action.39 Given the foundational role that it plays, 
praxeologists assert that the axiom of human action is absolutely, universally true. 
Praxeologists hold such confidence because they believe that any attempt to refute the 
axiom of human action is a self-contradiction.40 That is, the very act of disproving the 
axiom is itself a purposeful act. With this reasoning, praxeologists assert that the axiom of 
human action, “is true for all human beings, everywhere, at any time, and could not even 
conceivably be violated.”41 
From the axiom of human action, a few other self-evident axioms are derived, such 
as the diversity of mankind and nature and the conception of leisure as a consumer good. 
For the purpose of this paper, it is not important to delineate all the subsidiary axioms of 
praxeology. Instead, the essential point is that the whole of praxeology is based on a priori 
axioms. After asserting the universal validity of these axioms, the rest of the method 
follows from logical deduction. A true premise, with valid reasoning, must yield a true 
conclusion.  
The second aspect of praxeology, verbal logical deduction, requires much less 
explanation than the axiom of human action. Put simply, as mathematics is the language of 
                                                
36 Murray N. Rothbard, “In Defense of ‘Extreme Apriorism,’” Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 23, No. 
3, 385. 
37 Murray N. Rothbard, “Praxeology: The Methodology of Austrian Economics,” 59. From Rothbard, The 
Logic of Action One: Method, Money, and the Austrian School, 58-77 (Edward Elger, 1997). 
38 Ibid, 58. 
39 Ibid, 58. 
40 Ibid, 68. 
41 Rothbard, “In Defense of ‘Extreme Apriorism,’” 317. 
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modern economics, logic is the language of praxeology. Praxeologists insist on verbal logic, 
as opposed to symbolic logic or mathematics, because only words can preserve the meaning 
of the concept. On this point, Rothbard references a strange bedfellow, John Maynard 
Keynes, who in The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money argued that, “Too 
large a proportion of recent ‘mathematical’ economics are mere concoctions…which allow 
the author to lose sight of the complexities and interdependencies of the real world in a 
maze of pretentious and unhelpful symbols.’”42 Keynes held that economics was a branch 
of logic, and that much could be learned by simply working with axioms about economics 
activity.43 By insisting on meaningful verbal deduction, therefore, praxeologists argue that 
the validity embodied in the initial premises is preserved, thus creating a true conclusion.44 
The final aspect of praxeology, a rejection of empirical testing, places praxeology in 
fundamental opposition to both experimental economics and econometrics. First, note that 
from the perspective of a praxeologist, empirically testing a conclusion is simply 
unnecessary. If a logical proof has a true premise and valid deduction, the conclusion must 
be true. More contentiously, praxeologists argue that any type of empirical methodology 
assumes that historical data can express causality. “All that these methods [i.e. logical 
positivism, institutionalism, econometrics] can establish is history, that is, the description of 
complex phenomena…it is impossible to derive knowledge that could tell us something 
about the effects to be expected in the future from the application of definite measures and 
policies.”45 The past, a praxeologist argues, cannot be interpreted as a guide for the future. 
While the idea of isolating causation through the hypothetico-deductive method 
works well in the natural sciences, praxeologists argue that it has no relevance in the social 
sciences. Economists lack any type of controlled testing and therefore need to follow a 
completely different method of reasoning than the natural sciences. On this point, 
praxeologists again have the support of John Maynard Keynes. As Keynes argued, “I want 
to emphasize strongly the point about economics being a moral science…It is as though the 
fall of the apple to the ground depended on the apple’s motives, on whether it is worth 
while falling to the ground, and whether the ground wanted the apple to fall, and on 
mistaken calculations on the part of the apple as to how far it was from the centre of the 
earth.”46 Because the social sciences deal with fundamentally different subjects—Mises 
emphasized free will47 while Keynes noted the inconsistency and heterogeneity of 
                                                
42 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, 297-298 in Rothbard, 
“Praxeology,” 61. 
43 Keynes, in Daniel M. Hausman, The Philosophy of Economics: An Anthology, 286 (Cambridge 
University Press, 1994). This methodological agreement between praxeologists and Keynes is especially 
noteworthy, given the differences between Austrian Business Cycle Theory and Keynes’s General 
Theory. 
44 Rothbard, “Praxeology,” 61. 
45 Mises, vii. 
46 Hausman, The Philosophy of Economics, 288. 
47 Mises, 11. 
12 
economic activity48—the very idea of testing theories with empirical data is rejected by 
praxeologists. 
As a final argument against empirical testing, Mises cites a problem all too familiar 
to critics of economics: two economists using the same data to support contradictory 
theories. This problem, Mises claims, is indicative of the uselessness of empirical testing. 
Only by reverting to universally-valid theory can economists hope to resolve such disputes 
about empirical data.49 As I will argue in Section B of Part III, however, praxeologists also 
fall victim to this criticism.50 
 
2. Rational Choice Theory 
 
While praxeologists are a relative narrow, homogenous group, rational choice 
theory encompasses a varied and often conflicting group of economists. This general term 
includes some economists who are sympathetic to the arguments of praxeology—i.e. Lionel 
Robbins, Friedrich Hayek, and Frank Knight51–as well as more recent, mainstream 
economists, such as game theorists. By rational choice theorist, I mean someone who starts 
with certain assumptions about human behavior—e.g. utility maximization and transitive 
preferences52–and works out the conclusions using mathematics. It is interesting to note that 
while utility maximization and transitivity are not among the fundamental axioms for 
praxeology, praxeologists nonetheless rely on them to deduce the answers to economic 
questions.53 Despite these common assumptions (or axioms from the praxeologist’s view) 
there are two significant differences between praxeologists and rational choice theorists. 
First, unlike praxeologists, rational choice theorists accept that their assumptions are 
unrealistic or simplifying, and, therefore, rational choice theorists do not reject all empirical 
testing outright. Although based on unrealistic assumptions, rational choice theorists believe 
that their conclusions are still useful.54 Although they have no empirical content, a game 
theorist’s claims may still identify consequences and make predictions.55 While game 
theorists may eschew empirical testing, they do not advocate the validity of their initial 
assumptions. Game theorists do not maintain the universal validity of utility maximization; 
instead, they see it as a necessary simplifying assumption. 
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Second, rational choice theorists make use of mathematical proofs, not verbal 
logical. Because this approach is much more familiar than praxeology, I need not explain it 
in further detail here. I’ll save further analysis of rational choice theory for my examination 
of how it is used in the economic literature on tying. 
Before I explain what praxeology and rational choice theory would look like in a 
tying case, I want to make note of two prominent schools of thought in antitrust analysis, 
the Chicago School and the Structure-Conduct-Performance School, that preach empiricism 
but often practice pure theory. These inconsistencies in the Chicago and SCP schools, 
therefore, show how prevalent a priori conclusions are, even among those schools that 
guard against them.   
Insistence on empirically testing theory is often the defining characteristic of the 
Chicago School, as is tersely stated by Judge Frank Easterbrook: “No question should be 
answered without adequate data.”56 Yet Easterbrook’s colleague on the 7th Circuit Court, 
Richard Posner, argues instead that using the tools of general economic theory is the basic 
tenet of the Chicago School of antitrust.57 Even more revealing is Posner’s remark that, “It 
is a curiosity, and a source of regreat, that to this day very few of [Alan] Director’s ideas 
have been subjected to systematic empirical examination.”58 
The Structure-Conduct-Performance School (SCP) was the dominant approach to 
antitrust analysis before Chicago and was predicated on a case-study method, which used 
theory to isolate questions and empirics to answer those questions.59 Scherer described the 
SCP position on theory this way: “When a tradeoff must be made, the pure theorist will 
sacrifice some explanatory power for elegance, while the industrial organization specialist 
tilts in the opposite direction.”60 Still, despite this insistence on empiricism, the SCP 
approach tended toward premature conclusions regarding potentially anti-competitive 
practices. As Easterbrook argues, SCP taught that “you could tell whether competition was 
feasible from the structure of the market.”61 By focusing on the first step, market structure, 
the SCP approach often ignored the relevant criterion, market performance. Such disregard 
for practical consequences highlights the gap between articulating and implementing the 
SCP methodology. 
Having outlined the basic approach of praxeology and rational choice theory, we 
can now examine how these approaches would be used as evidence in tying cases, 
specifically for a case evaluating the leverage theory of monopoly. The leverage theory 
posits that if a monopolist controls market A, then by tying good A to good B, the 
                                                
56 Frank H. Easterbrook, “Workable Antitrust Policy,” Michigan Law Review, Vol. 84, No. 8, 1701 
57 Posner, “The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 
127, No. 4, 925. 
58 Ibid 931. 
59 Stephen Martin, Advanced Industrial Economics, 4 (Blackwell Publishers Inc., 2002). 
60 F.M. Scherer, and David Ross. Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance. 3rd ed. 
(Houghton Mifflin, 1990). 
61 Easterbrook, 1696. 
14 
monopolist can leverage her monopoly from market A to market B. If the leverage theory is 
correct, then tying arrangements need to be scrutinized to ensure that monopolists are not 
curtailing competition in other markets. A priorists line up on both sides of the leverage 
theory: while praxeologists and Chicago School rational choice theorists reject the leverage 
theory, game theorists like Barry Nalebuff endorse it. Because theoretical evidence, 
especially praxeology, is rarely used in tying cases, I will use examples from academia as 
proxies for theoretical evidence in a legal setting. My purpose here is not to present a 
thorough example of how a theorist would testify in court, but merely to demonstrate how 
the different approaches to economic evidence apply to tying law. 
First, let me describe a praxeological approach, as presented by Dominick 
Armentano’s in his book Antitrust and Monopoly.62 Because praxeology rejects symbolic 
logic, Armentano’s analysis of tying arrangements is entirely verbal. A praxeological 
judgment about a tying arrangement relies on two steps. First, Armentano starts from the 
axiom of human action: “[I]ndividual human action is purposeful and aims at 
accomplishing selected ends by adopting patterns of resource use (plans) consistent with 
those ends.”63 Second, Armentano devises an efficiency criterion: “If the means employed 
in the pursuit of selected ends are consistent with those ends, then the means or plans are 
said to be efficiently employed.”64 Tying is useless as leverage because the monopolist is 
already charging a monopoly price for good A, and any attempt to charge more for bundle 
AB will deviate from the monopoly price—that is, the price will not longer be profit-
maximizing.65 The monopolist, therefore, can do no better selling the tied goods than he can 
by selling A and B independently.66 Relying on the axiom that all human behavior must be 
purposeful, therefore, Armentano shows that because tying cannot increase monopoly 
profits, monopolists have no incentive to use tying as a type of leverage. Any tying 
arrangement, therefore, must have an efficiency justification. 
This response to the leverage theory, although given by a praxeologist, is known as 
the single-monopoly-profit theorem and is also associated with the Chicago rational choice 
approach. Unless the tying is done for efficiency reasons, i.e. price discrimination, then the 
monopolist derives no additional profits from tying a monopolized good to a non-
monopolized good.67 This argument relies on the premise of human action, or profit-
maximization. Because tying cannot logically increase monopoly profits, both schools 
conclude a priori that the practice is not a threat to competition. 
An alternate a priori perspective is given by game theorist Barry Nalebuff in his 
paper, “Bundling as a Way to Leverage Monopoly.” Unlike Chicago theorists, Nalebuff 
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does not assume that consumers buy the bundled goods in a fixed proportion.68 By changing 
a single assumption of the model, therefore, Nalebuff shows demonstrates a scenario in 
which the single-monopoly-profit theorem will not hold. Through mathematical proofs, 
Nalebuff shows that the Chicago single-monopoly-profit theorem is a special case of 
monopoly pricing. More generally, Nalebuff argues that a monopolist can profit by using a 
tying arrangement to leverage one monopoly into two monopolies.69 Despite using rational 
choice theory like the Chicago School theorists, Nalebuff reaches a different conclusion by 
altering some assumptions, namely allowing for continuous consumption levels.  
In fairness to Nalebuff, he does not hold his paper to be a categorical guide for 
antitrust policy; he merely argues that economists need to recognize that tying may be used 
to leverage monopoly.70 The point, however, is that Nalebuff uses no empirical testing to 
reach a conclusion about tying arrangements. Nalebuff espouses a theory and a warning 
about tying that is purely theoretical and based only on a priori reasoning. 
Theoretical evidence is preferable in tying cases for a couple of reasons. First, 
praxeology offers a method to arrive at true conclusions, without becoming ensnared in the 
problems surrounding simplifying assumptions like rationality or the practical aspects of 
data collection and verification. Rational choice theory, though it does not claim to arrive at 
universally true conclusions, is especially applicable in a trial setting because it does not 
require a historical data set (as econometrics does) or laboratory testing (as experimental 
economics does). 
 
B. Experimental 
  
 By experimental evidence, I mean the use of laboratory methods to test economic 
theory. While I am classifying it as an empirical approach, experimental economics cannot 
exist without theory. Still, it is inappropriate to classify experimental economics as a 
theoretical approach, because experimentalists insist on empirical testing. As van Fraassen 
argues, “The real importance of theory, to the working scientist, is that it is a factor in 
experimental design.”71  That experimental evidence can draw on theory and not vice versa 
is not illegitimate; while experimentalists demand a blend of theory and empiricism, a 
priorists reject the idea of empirical testing. Experimental evidence is distinct from theory 
because it replaces assumption with observation, and it is distinct from econometrics 
because laboratory tests generate their own data in a controlled setting. 
Vernon Smith describes economic experiments as a three-part framework: 1) an 
environment that often uses money to motivate exchange, 2) an institution that sets the rules 
of the game and coordinates communication, and 3) behavior of the subjects, which is the 
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result of the environment and institution.72 Simply put, experimentalists attempt to trim the 
number of assumptions—i.e. rational choice theory—needed to test an economic theory in 
the hopes of generating more accurate predictions. The goal is to create a laboratory set-up 
that mimics the characteristics of the market and motivations of market actors while 
isolating and controlling interesting variables. By following the experimental methodology 
more characteristic of the natural sciences, experimental economists hope to achieve similar 
success with regards to predictive accuracy. 
 Before listing the advantages of experimental evidence, I need to distinguish what I 
am labeling experimental economics from two similar fields. First, experimental economics 
is separate from behavioral economics, even though both may use laboratory methods can 
be used for a number of purposes, including testing theories, generalizing theories, and 
creating new theories.73 Behavioral economics is more closely associated with psychology 
than economics, especially with regards to the underlying theory, and places more emphasis 
on explanation—that is, generalizing or creating new theories. Because this paper is specific 
to tying law and economic instrumentalism, I use experimental economics to refer to an 
approach that specifically focuses on testing the predictions of economic theory. 
 Second, by experimental economics, I mean laboratory experiments, not field 
experiments. In using this terminology, I am following the convention of Al Roth: “I am 
speaking of experiments in which the economic environment is very fully under the control 
of the experimenter, who also has relatively unimpeded access to the experimental subjects. 
This distinguishes laboratory experiments from 'field' experiments, in which relatively few 
aspects of the environment can be controlled, and in which only limited access to most of 
the economic agents may be available.”74  
 An experimental approach to economic evidence has three unique advantages: data 
generation, control, and replication. Because laboratory experiments generate the relevant 
data set, there is no need to search for a historical data set and no problems with missing 
data. Empirical studies are only as good as the underlying data used to make the 
conclusions, and data availability is never a problem for experimentalists. 
 Because the data is generated within a laboratory setting, experimentalists also have 
greater control over the variables, making it easier to isolate and test causal factors. As 
Talley notes, “[O]utside of the rare natural experiment, it is frequently difficult – perhaps 
prohibitively so – to make causal inferences from real-world data.”75 The task of teasing out 
causal relationships is often problematic for econometricians, a difficulty which is avoided 
by experimentalists: “[T]here need never be a signal-to-noise problem in experimental 
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economics. To put it informally, there need never be a problem of disentangling multiply 
correlated influences.”76 
Finally, experimental studies can be replicated, whereas econometric studies are 
specific to an individual historical data set. By replication, I mean that “other experimenters 
should be able to employ the same techniques, the same protocols, and the same 
inducements to similar subject pools to attain comparable results.”77 Replication not only 
increases the quantity of data, but it also decreases the likelihood that conclusions are 
influenced by the economists, whether intentionally or not. 
Since their inception, experimental methods have been linked to industrial 
organization, if not to antitrust law. Even though the first experiments run by Edward 
Chamberlin examined imperfect markets, experimental methods have not been accepted or 
used in antitrust cases, let alone in tying cases. To understand what experimental evidence 
would look like in a tying case, therefore, we must again use a proxy from the academic 
sphere. A good example of experimental testing of a tying arrangement is provided by 
Caliskan, et al.78 
In their paper, Caliskan, et al. first generate hypotheses by using game theory. They 
make five assumptions: 1) goods A and B are perfectly positively correlated, 2) market A is 
a monopoly and market B is a duopoly, 3) the marginal cost of production is zero for both 
firms, 4) a Stackelberg model is used to compute the equilibrium conditions, and 5) demand 
curves are determined by “high” and “low” gain treatments. After working out the 
equilibrium conditions, the experimenters generate a number of hypotheses.79 For example, 
conjecture 1 states that the monopolist adopts a pure bundling strategy under the low gain 
treatments.  
After the data is generated by the laboratory test, corresponding findings are 
presented for each hypothesis. For example, the laboratory data show that in a low gain 
treatment, the monopolist adopted a pure bundling strategy only 10-55% of the time, 
contrary to the original hypothesis.80 The paper also details the laboratory environment, 
explaining what the subjects had control over, how often prices could change, and how data 
was recorded. I will address these elements of the experiment further in Part IV, Section B. 
In sum, this paper shows that although theory is essential for the experiment, the 
conclusions are based on the empirical data, not the theoretical implications. The 
experiments conclude, “[O]nly in extreme cases does the bundle pricing strategy employed 
by the monopolist lead to a decrease in the number of sellers that the monopolist faces in 
the oligopolistic market…”81 Though the hypotheses drawn from game theory suggested 
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that the bundling was exclusionary, therefore, the experimental data provide less evidence 
against the tying arrangement. 
 
C. Econometrics 
 
 Econometric methods are much more familiar to economists and more accepted in 
the legal sphere as well. Econometric evidence, in fact, has been used in antitrust law since 
the 1970s.82 Basically, econometrics means testing economic theory by applying statistical 
techniques to historical data sets. When talking about econometrics in tying law, I am really 
talking about a small set of econometric techniques that are well-established in the 
economics profession, specifically multiple regression analysis. As with experimental 
evidence, econometrics as defined in this paper is inextricable from some use of theory and 
can be described as a two-part process: 1) deriving hypotheses from economic theory, and 
2) testing these hypotheses using statistical methods. Econometrics, however, is distinct 
from theoretical approaches because it demands empirical testing of conclusions, and it is 
distinct from experiments both in how data is gathered and how predictions are tested. 
While an experimental approach generates and tests data in a controlled laboratory, 
econometrics accumulates data from past market transactions and tests the data using 
statistical theory. 
 Econometrics is useful in tying law, because, as Jonathan Baker argues, “The great 
promise of statistical methods is that they permit a systematic synthesis of the quantitative 
evidence, weighting the most informative data points the most heavily.”83 We can organize 
the advantages of econometric evidence under two main headings. First, econometric 
studies use a large data set drawn from the transactions of numerous producers and 
consumers: “[E]conometric evidence allows for the aggregation of all the material data on a 
particular issue, and thus avoids the danger of considering only selected data points that 
may be unrepresentative.”84 
 Second, thorough econometric studies often identify causal links. In the early days 
of modern econometrics, statisticians were trying to devise testing methods that rivaled the 
precision of laboratory-controlled tests.85 In addition to aggregation and control, Rubinfeld 
argues that, “Multiple regression also may be useful (1) in determining whether a particular 
effect is present; (2) in measuring the magnitude of a particular effect; and (3) in forecasting 
what a particular effect would be, but for an intervening event.”86 
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 A good proxy for econometric work in tying law is “Foreclosure of Railroad 
Markets: A Test of the Chicago Leverage Theory.”87 As with experiments, though theory is 
essential to an econometric study, the conclusions are based on the data: “[T]he degree to 
which a firm with a monopoly in one good may extend this power by vertical integration or 
tying cannot be resolved theoretically…The effects of vertical integration or tying on prices 
are dependent on a set of empirical parameters particular to a given market.”88 Using 
evidence drawn from 395 railroad markets, the authors used least-squares estimation to 
calculate the effect of a number of explanatory variables, such as the number of interline 
competitors.89 The authors conclude that monopoly power may be used to increase profits 
in a separate market, although tying may not be effective as a foreclosure strategy.90 
Now that I have defined the three approaches to economic evidence, we are now 
able to start making conclusions about the preferred approach. The first step is to reject 
theoretical evidence in favor of empirical evidence—empirical meaning both experimental 
and econometric. The rationale for rejecting theoretical evidence is based on a defense of 
empiricism, which I will defend positively, using current legal standards, and normatively, 
using arguments from the philosophy of science. 
While empiricism provides a way to reject theoretical evidence, it does not 
adequately distinguish between experimental and econometric evidence. The second step, 
therefore, is to explain why econometric evidence is preferable. In Part IV, I will first show 
that the general acceptance criterion in Daubert provides one reason to prefer econometric 
evidence, then I will elaborate on the concept of external validity to demonstrate why 
judges should continue to prefer econometric evidence in tying cases. 
 
III. Rejecting Theoretical Evidence 
 
Those who have treated of the sciences have been either empirics or dogmatical. The former like 
ants only heap up and use their store, the latter like spiders spin out their own webs. The bee, a 
mean between both, extracts matter from the flowers of the garden and the field, but works and 
fashions it by its own efforts. 
-Sir Francis Bacon91 
 
 In Part III, I will explain why judges should reject theoretical evidence in favor of 
empirical—both experimental and econometric—evidence. First, I will explain how current 
legal standards can serve as a guide about what constitutes “good” evidence, then I will 
explain why the empirical philosophy in these standards is correct. At the conclusion of Part 
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III, I will have shown why judges should prefer empirical evidence, but I will not have 
shown why judges should prefer either experiments or econometrics.  
 
A. Legal Standards 
 
 When writing about science in the law and specifically about the admissibility of 
evidence, the main legal standards are found in the case of Daubert v. Merrill Dow 
Pharmaceuticals.92 Daubert was the first time the Supreme Court ruled on what constitutes 
scientific evidence in court, and the ruling dramatically changed the role of a judge with 
regards to scientific or expert testimony.93 Before Daubert, the two main standards for a 
judge were articulated in Frye v. United States94 and in the Federal Rules of Evidence.95 
The criterion in Frye—which was the main test from 1923 to 1973—asserts that “expert 
opinion based on a scientific technique is inadmissible unless the technique is ‘generally 
accepted’ as reliable in the relevant scientific community.”96 In 1973, the Federal Rules of 
Evidence superceded the Frye test. According to the Federal Rules of Evidence, “in order to 
qualify as ‘scientific knowledge,’ an inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific 
method.”97 This criterion held for another 20 years, until the Supreme Court ruled on 
Daubert. 
 Daubert was a fundamental change because it moved the judgment of good 
evidence away from the scientific community and into judges’ hands. The crucial language 
is that Daubert made judges the “gatekeepers” of valid scientific evidence; instead of 
deferring to the relevant scientific community, judges are now asked to regulate good 
evidence according to their own standards. A significant limitation, however, is that judges 
evaluate evidence based only on the methodology, not the conclusions that a certain 
approach produces.98 Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, admits that a judge will 
have less knowledge about a discipline than a practicing academic, but argues that such a 
gatekeeping role, “is the balance that is struck by Rules of Evidence designed not for the 
exhaustive search for cosmic understanding but for the particularized resolution of legal 
disputes.”99  Blackmun’s language parallels the point I made about economic 
instrumentalism: the legal sphere has distinct goals (i.e. resolution) that are distinct from 
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academic goals (i.e. “cosmic understanding”). Economic evidence, therefore, should be 
evaluated as a tool of prediction, not a explanation of reality. 
 Before explaining the criteria in Daubert in further detail, it is important to note two 
other aspects about Daubert. First, Daubert is the first in a series of three rulings about 
scientific evidence. The other ruling that is relevant for this paper is Kumho Tire v. 
Carmichael100; in Kumho the criteria in Daubert were explicitly extended to cover all expert 
testimony, including economic experts. Second, while Daubert can be divided into two 
parts—reliability and relevance—I will only focus on reliability in this paper. Because 
economics is useful in tying cases as a predictive tool, it is most important to discuss the 
reliability of economic evidence, not its relevance. 
If Daubert only assigned a gatekeeping role for the judge, the ruling would be 
significant, though not very helpful. In Daubert, however, the court outlined four criteria 
for evaluating the admissibility of scientific evidence: 1) empirical testing, 2) peer review, 
3) known error rate, and 4) general acceptance.101 In this paper, I’ll be focusing on only two 
of these criteria: empirical testing and general acceptance. I will not be addressing peer 
review or known error rate because they do not provide substantial additional reasons  to 
distinguish between theoretical and empirical evidence (as the empirical testing criterion 
does) or between experimental and econometic evidence (as the general acceptance 
criterion does). Also, it is important to note that the Court explicitly avoided presenting a 
comprehensive list of criteria. These four criteria, therefore, should be read as necessary, 
though not sufficient, aspects of scientific evidence. As I will show in Part VI, we will need 
to add the criterion of external validity in order to sufficiently distinguish between 
experimental and econometric evidence. 
Now that I have laid out Daubert’s criteria, it is clear why judges should prefer 
empirical over theoretical evidence. The first criterion, empirical testing, rules out both 
praxeology and rational choice theory as I explained them in Part II, Section A. Justice 
Blackmun, writing for the majority, argues that generating hypotheses and testing them is 
what distinguishes scientific thought from other types of inquiry. Purely theoretical 
approaches, therefore, should not be considered scientific, and consequently should not be 
relied upon when ruling on tying cases. Praxeology is clearly non-testable, and it has been 
shown that game theory is non-testable as well.102 
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Even before ruling on Daubert, the Supreme Court was moving away from relying 
on theoretical evidence.103 For example, in Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, 
“Kodak’s theory does not explain the actual market behavior revealed in the record…we 
cannot reach [the petitioner, Kodak Co.’s] conclusions as a matter of law on a record this 
sparse.”104 While one could rely on the opinion of the Supreme Court, it is important to go 
beyond positive evidence to reach a conclusion. So the Supreme Court ruled that 
empiricism is the foundation of science; why is the Supreme Court correct? An answer to 
this question requires a more general defense of empiricism. 
 
B. Why Empiricism? 
  
Empiricism is the belief that experience is the source of knowledge.105 In this paper, 
it is important to clarify that what I call empirical approaches—experimental economics and 
econometrics—are a blend of theoretical and empirical knowledge. That empirical 
approaches can draw for theory and not vice versa is legitimate; remember that Mises 
argued that, “In all of its branches, [economics] is a priori, not empirical. Like logic and 
mathematics, it is not derived from experience; it is prior to experience.”106 While pure 
theorists reject any empirical testing, empiricists require an initial framework built from 
theory. 
Empiricism has a long, complex history that runs through Aristotle, Hume, and the 
logical empiricists, and it connects many distinct and conflicting schools within the 
philosophy of science.107 For example, in Daubert, Justice Blackmun referenced both Carl 
Hempel, a logical empiricist, and Karl Popper, who articulated falsificationism as an 
alternative to logical empiricism. It would be inappropriate to group Hempel and Popper 
together generally, but both philosophers agreed that a scientific approach requires testing 
hypotheses. While empiricists may disagree with each other on many issues, they are united 
by their belief that conclusions must be consistent with observation. The reason judges 
should rely on empirical evidence in tying cases is the same reason why empiricism is 
strong in the philosophy of science is the: empirical approaches are more objective than 
theoretical approaches. 
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1. Data Objectivity 
 
The term “objectivity” carries a lot of baggage in the philosophy of science, often 
meaning either 1) unbiased or 2) mind-independent.108 Neither of these two definitions 
captures what I mean by objectivity in this paper. First, I agree that empirical economic 
research is not completely unbiased or value-free; the type of absolute separation between 
positive and normative economics advocated by Milton Friedman in “The Methodology of 
Positive Economics” has not been fulfilled, if such a separation is even possible.109 
Furthermore, freedom from bias is not feasible in law either, which is part of the rationale 
for legal pragmatism.110 Second, I do not mean objective in the sense of mind-
independence. On an abstract level, every economist or judge has certain biases that affect 
how empirical data are interpreted. As Kuhn argued, the prevailing paradigm greatly shapes 
scientists’ viewpoints and affects their work.111 Scientists do not constantly test every 
minute detail about the common assumptions in their discipline, let alone how their society 
or their language affects their research. Doubt about whether empirical research is mind-
independent, however, does not mean that it is futile to distinguish between valid and 
invalid scientific evidence. It is beyond the scope of this paper to systematically examine 
the sociological factors in science or arguments about scientific realism, but I do want to 
emphasize that by objectivity, I do not mean value-free or mind-independent interpretation 
of empirical data. 
So what is objectivity? In this paper, I will use the term data objectivity to 
distinguish from other uses of the word objectivity. Data objectivity is a measure of 
separation between the economist and the data. In any empirical study, there is necessarily a 
mix of two elements: a subjective (biased, normative) economist and objective (neutral, 
positive) data. One could also consider research as a mix between a priori, theoretical 
evidence and a posteriori, empirical evidence. The conclusions of an empirical study rely 
not only on the data, therefore, but partially on the economist, who controls the theory, 
variables, assumptions, etc. For an empiricist, the more the conclusion relies on the data—
alternatively, the less power the economist has over the conclusion—the more confident we 
can be in the conclusion. An empiricist becomes more skeptical about a conclusion when 
the conclusions are altered by subjective or theoretical elements. The acme of objectivity is 
                                                
108 “Sometimes objectivity is taken to mean the absence of bias; objectivity is impartiality or fairness. But 
the term “objective” is also often used to express claims about whether the existence of something is 
independent of our minds.” See Godfrey-Smith, 6. 
109 David Goddard articulates the futility of unbiased science further in “Max Weber and the Objectivity 
of Social Science” History and Theory, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1: “No science is value-free, for all scientific 
activity (because it is an activity, a human activity) presupposes some framework of meanings or values 
in terms of which it is judged meaningful, worthwhile, or useful.  
110 See Monahan and Walker on the legal realism movement with Jerome Frank: ““The human element in 
the administration of justice by judges is irrepressible. A judicial decision is a decision by a human being 
called a judge, [who has] human prejudices, passions and weaknesses. 
111 Godfrey-Smith, 80. 
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characterized by the steps in the hypothetico-deductive method: a scientist makes a 
hypothesis, then the data indicates whether the hypothesis is rejected. Ideally, the 
conclusion is shown by the data, it is not made by the scientist. 
In sum, empiricism is based on letting the data speak for themselves; one’s a priori 
notions should defer to empirical observations from the physical world. Data objectivity, 
therefore, is the foundation of empiricism, meaning that the subjective economist should 
defer to objective data. Making conclusions and predictions that are consistent with 
empirical observation is the whole point of empiricism. As Bernard Diamond argued, 
“[M]ysticism is the prediction of the future which is not based upon empirical observation; 
science is the prediction of the future which is based upon empirical observation.”112 What 
the data actually say is the crucial point; what the economists wants the data to say should 
be irrelevant. 
Now, certainly data cannot speak for themselves. We need to impose structure—
that is, economic theory—to decide what to look at. Even then, there are numerous other 
assumptions that are usually necessary to test or interpret data. As Bas van Fraaseen argues, 
“[E]xperimental design is exceedingly subtle and complex, so experimental design is 
exceedingly difficult. Hence the need for the construction of theories…”113 A valid caution 
for econometrics, in fact, is that one should not make theory from data; otherwise 
untangling causation and correlation becomes arbitrary. The insistence of theory as a 
necessary structure for testing, however, does not invalidate the point that empiricism 
essentially means relying on the data to make conclusions. 
Data objectivity is just one reason to insist on empiricism. Two additional reasons 
are progress, the idea that only empirical approaches change as we update our views of the 
world, and resolution, the idea that approaches—especially in the legal sphere—need to 
help us decide disputes. Let me begin by explaining why a progressive approach is 
desirable, which is motivated by the concept of fallibilism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
112 Bernard L. Diamond, “The Scientific Method and the Law,” Hastings Law Journal, Vol. 19, No. 179, 
181. While I agree with Diamond’s basic point, it should be noted that I disagree with his description of 
social sciences and empiricism. Diamond argues that the social sciences do not made adequate use of 
either empirical observation or mathematics. See Diamond,186. 
113 van Fraassen, 73. Van Fraassen goes on to argue that, “Scientists aim to discover facts about the 
world—about the regularities in the observable part of the world. To discover these, one needs 
experimentation as opposed to reason and reflection” (van Fraassen, 73). 
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2. Progress114 
 
In the philosophy of science, fallibilism is the realization that our current ideas will 
probably turn out to be wrong.115 The history of science demonstrates the constant 
replacement of old theories by new theories, so scientists would be well-advised to 
anticipate that such a pattern will continue. As Albert Einstein noted, “There are no eternal 
theories in science. It always happens that some of the facts predicted by a theory are 
disproved by experiment. Every theory has its period of gradual development and triumph, 
after which it may experience a rapid decline.”116 Fallibilism is creative destruction in the 
marketplace of ideas, and it fosters an intellectual humility regarding our economic theories. 
The impact of fallibilism can be found in the way that statisticians talk about hypothesis 
testing; they are careful to either “reject the null hypothesis” or “fail to reject the null 
hypothesis,” never confirming either way.117  
Because fallibilism is well-supported in the philosophy of science,118 it is important 
for judges to rely on evidence that deals with the problems that fallibilism presents. In sum, 
judges must prefer empirical approaches because only empirical approaches progress; 
empirical approaches offer the best chance to avoid applying false theories. If fallibilism is 
like creative destruction, then empiricism is like the price system; empiricism is in constant 
flux, rejecting theories that become inconsistent as we gather more data or improve how we 
make observations. To complete the analogy, theoretical approaches are like a planned 
economy; a priorism does not respond to observation, meaning that the a priori conclusions 
are static in spite of any changes or improvements. If the caution of fallibilism is correct, 
then we should be eager to embrace empiricism—the approach that helps us weed out bad 
theories. 
Now a praxeologist may view this type of constancy as an advantage of a 
theoretical approach. In fact, a praxeologist would probably point to the constant 
                                                
114 Progress as a criterion for science can be found in Quay, “Progress as a Demarcation Criterion for the 
Sciences” Philosophy of Science, Vol. 41, No. 2: “(1) intrinsic to mature science, there exist at least two 
aspects of progress, present historically, as well as philosophically significant, which, in combination at 
least, characterize the progress of no other discipline; (2) the progress of science as a psycho-social 
phenomenon and as an element in the sciences' pattern of development is inadequate of itself (without 
some such demarcation criterion as Popper's super-added or presumed) to distinguish mature science 
from nonempirical disciplines.” (155) and in Paul R. Thagard, “Why Astrology is a Pseudoscience”, in 
Curd and Cover, 27: a theory or discipline is pseudo-scientific if and only if it meets two criteria: 1) the 
theory is less progressive—it does not change or improve its explanatory power—than alternative 
approaches, and 2) the community shows little interest in developing the theory towards solving problems 
or evaluating the theory in relation to others and is selective about considering confirmations and 
disconfirmations (32). 
115 The term fallibilism is credited to Charles Sanders Pierce. See Godfrey-Smith, 59. 
116 Albert Einstein in Weller, 881. 
117 This type of language may also be influenced by Popper’s falsificationism, which is summarized in 
Godfrey-Smith, 61. 
118 Godfrey-Smith, 59. 
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uncertainty in empirical studies as an indication of problems with empiricism.119 To refute 
such a claim, one only needs to study the history of an empirical discipline—whether 
economics or a natural science—and conclude that contemporaneous scientists have more 
predictive power than earlier scientists. A number of factors, whether technological, 
cultural, or institutional, affect the stock of scientific knowledge, and it would be radical to 
argue that human beings have the same understanding of the world today as we had in 
ancient times. Such a growth in the stock of knowledge is characteristic of empirical, not 
theoretical, approaches. Because the axiom of human action is true at all times for all 
people, the same conclusions should hold today and two millennia from now. What 
empirical economists know today, however, may be only a fraction of what they will know 
in the future. 
To clarify the need for a progressive approach, consider the evolution of tying law 
over the past century. Initially, tying arrangements were treated as per se illegal by the 
courts, means that they were considered inherently anti-competitive.120 As antitrust became 
more economically-based in the second half of the twentieth century, however, courts began 
to judge tying arrangements according to the rule of reason, meaning that the consequences 
of the arrangements had to be considered before a ruling could be made. If the courts had 
insisted on using the a priori per se rule, there would be no way for an efficient tying 
arrangement to survive. An arrangement that would benefit consumers, therefore, would be 
deemed illegal. The advantage of the rule of reason and for empiricism is clear: as judges 
come to better understand the world, they can adjust their rulings to generate better 
consequences. 
In fact, this type of evolution can happen within a single tying case, as in U.S. v. 
Microsoft.121 In District Court, Judge Jackson used the per se rule to find that Microsoft’s 
tying arrangement—bundling Internet Explorer with the Windows operating system—
violated §1 of the Sherman Act.122 Furthermore, it is significant that Judge Jackson deemed 
the tying arrangement illegal, despite the fact that “The government did not present an 
economic analysis of how Microsoft’s inclusion of IE [Internet Explorer] in Windows 
would reduce consumer welfare.”123 Judge Jackson’s a priori conclusion was overturned by 
the D.C. Circuit court, which instead applied the rule of reason. The Circuit Court found 
that Microsoft’s justifications for tying—that it benefits consumers and improves the 
Windows operating system for third-party software—meant that the per se analysis was 
                                                
119 See note 49. 
120 Wright, 3. Especially in earlier antitrust rulings, the per se approach was standard, leading to 
conclusions like, “it is unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market,” 
(International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947)), and “[t]ying arrangements serve 
hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition.” (Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 
293, 305-6 (1949)). 
121 U.S. v. Microsoft Corporation, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
122 U.S. v. Microsoft Co., COL, 2. 
123 David S. Evans, Albert L. Nichols, and Richard Schmalensee, “An analysis of the government’s 
economic case in U.S. v. Microsoft,” The Antitrust Bulletin, Summer 2001, 235. 
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inapplicable. The progression of judicial rulings in the Microsoft case, therefore, shows the 
friction between a priori and a posteriori conclusions and demonstrates the deficiencies of 
purely theoretical evidence. 
In sum, a lack of progress with a priori evidence is what allows critics to compare 
economics to religion,124 and it has persuaded Austrian-inclined economists to move away 
from the radical apriorism of Mises and Rothbard.125 
 
3. Resolution 
 
A final reason to prefer empirical approaches is that the legal sphere requires an 
approach that can resolve disputes. Resolution, meaning that a conclusion can be non-
arbitrary and persuasive, is essential in all areas of law, but here I will focus on its use in 
tying law. Empirical approaches are more conducive to resolution because they rely on 
foundational assumptions that are more commonly accepted than the foundational 
assumptions of praxeology or rational choice theory. To motivate the concept of resolution, 
consider two separate tying cases: in one case, the parties rely on theoretical evidence, and 
in the second case, the parties rely on empirical evidence. 
In the first case, although all parties rely on theoretical evidence, it is unlikely that 
the parties—even if both are praxeologists—will have the exact same fundamental 
assumptions.126 In this example, then, one party will be a praxeologist and the other a 
rational choice theorist. Even though both parties may have the same goal—to maximize 
allocative efficiency—it is unlikely they will resolve the dispute. Both parties insist on 
working deductively from foundational assumptions, but they are working from different 
foundational assumptions. Each party will try to persuade the other, but they cannot 
convince each other by referencing new evidence or other experiences. Each party is talking 
within his a priori framework, leaving him incapable of convincing someone who starts 
from different assumptions. As Posner writes, “[R]easoning to (or from) foundations is 
convincing only to the already convinced.”127 
Now consider the second case, where the parties rely on empirical evidence. They 
all have the same goal, but they put forth different hypotheses. By testing these hypotheses 
against empirical data, however, they are much more likely to resolve the dispute. It needs 
to be emphasized, however, that empiricism is a way for parties to resolve disputes, as long 
as the principles of testing are accepted. This last clause deserves emphasis, because it is 
                                                
124 Charles K. Wilber, “The Miseducation of Economists,” America: The National Catholic Weekly, Sept. 
28, 2009, 12. 
125 Mark Skousen, Vienna & Chicago: Friends or Foes? 126 (Capital Press, 2005). 
126 For example, see the debate about the difficulties surrounding “natural” monopolies among 
praxeologists. See Israel Kirzner, Competition and Entrepreneurship, 103, and Murray N. Rothbard, 
Power and the Market, chapter 3, section R. 
127 Posner, “Pragmatism Liberalism versus Classical Liberalism,” The University of Chicago Law Review, 
Vol. 71, No. 2. 659. 
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not obviously true. While I think it is more likely that two disputing parties will agree to use 
econometrics than to use praxeology, one must acknowledge that there are significant 
disputes within any econometric study; while parties can agree on an empirical approach, 
they may still disagree about what data to use or which econometric techniques are 
necessary. These are valid concerns, but they are less problematic than the alternative 
problems with theoretical approaches. Put another way, conflicting theorists are futilly 
trying to resolve contradictory closed logical systems; as long as your system is internally 
consistent, you cannot convince someone who rejects your initial premises. Empiricists, on 
the other hand, are able to make use of the dynamic world of observation and experience. 
Maybe your opponent isn’t convinced today, but the possibility of new data or better testing 
makes it more likely that she may become convinced at some point in the future. In sum, 
the problems within any given empirical approach are less intractable than the problems 
across theoretical approaches. 
 The advantages of empirical approaches regarding data objectivity, progress, and 
resolution, when combined with the legal standards articulated in Daubert, explain why 
judges should prefer empirical evidence over theoretical evidence. While I have rejected 
one approach to economic evidence in tying cases, I have yet to reach my final conclusion. 
In Part IV, therefore, I will explain why the concepts of general acceptability and externally 
validity provide the rationale for judges to prefer econometric evidence over experimental 
evidence.  
 
IV. Rejecting Experimental Evidence 
 
[O]ur statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but 
only as a corporate body. 
-W.V. Quine128 
 
A. General Acceptance 
  
General acceptance criterion means that practicing economists can speak with 
authority about what constitutes good economic evidence. Disciplines establish their own 
unique methodology and standards of review, and judges should look at the consensus in 
the relevant scientific community in order to rule on good scientific evidence.  General 
acceptance, the fourth criteron listed in Daubert, is a carried over from the ruling in Frye, in 
which it was the dominant criterion of scientific evidence. As Justice Blackmun writes in 
Daubert, “In the 70 years since its formulation in the Frye case, the ‘general acceptance’ 
test has been the dominant standard for determining the admissibility of novel scientific 
evidence at trial.” 
                                                
128 W.V. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” The Philosophical Review, Vol. 60, No. 1. 38. 
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 Besides the obvious reason that an industrial organization professor knows more 
about tying than an average sitting judge, the general acceptance test provides three main 
advantages129: 1) it ensures a minimum number of experts capable of evaluating evidence, 
2) scientific communities hold more homogenous opinions than judges, and 3) it preserves 
legal resources by forcing scientific communities to regulate their own methodologies. In 
addition to these largely pragmatic benefits, the general acceptance test is implicitly a 
consensus theory of truth.130  A consensus theory of truth simply means that what is 
considered true depends on what the majority of people think is true.  
Here, let me emphasize that I am not advocated that we rely solely on the consensus 
within the economics profession to decide what is good economic evidence; such a 
prescription would destroy any examination of methodology and would lead to a 
tautological cycle whereby the current methodology supports itself. Still, it is important to 
remember that economics is useful in tying cases because it is a predictive tool, and if one is 
deciding which tool is best suited for a job, one would be well-advised to ask other 
craftsmen. 
Consensus is an important test of validity for philosophers, including economists 
and judges.131 Deidre McCloskey’s influential views on rhetoric in economics, for example, 
is based on the idea of consensus: “We believe and act on what persuades us…what 
persuades well-educated participants in our civilizations and justly influential people in our 
field. To attempt to go beyond persuasive reasoning is to let epistemology limit reasonable 
persuasion.”132 Likewise, in Abrams v. United States, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
argued that consensus, the power of a thought to get itself accepted into the competition of 
the market, is the best test of truth.133 
Using the general acceptance test to prefer econometric evidence, therefore, is 
supported for two main reasons. First, it was the dominant legal standard for much of the 
20th century and it remains an explicit criterion in Daubert. Second, referencing a consensus 
theory of truth has support from both economists and jurists. In short, when deciding which 
method to follow in the marketplace of ideas, it is useful to understand which method is in 
highest demand. 
Having established that general acceptance is a useful criterion, it is evident which 
approach the economics profession prefers, at least right now. Despite the recent surge in 
                                                
129 Paul C. Gianelli, “The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-
Century Later,” Columbia Law Review, Vol. 80, No. 1197, 1207. 
130 For an overview of one consensus theory of truth, that of Jürgen Habermas, see Mary Hesse, 
“Habermas’ Consensus Theory of Truth,” PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of 
Science Association, Vol. 1978, 389. 
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132 Donald N. McCloskey, “The Rhetoric of Economics,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 21, June 
1983, 512. 
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30 
experimental economic research—accompanied by the publicity of behavioral economics—
it is clear that econometric testing still dominants economic research. Although modern 
econometrics and experimental economics started around the same time, by nearly any 
measure—journals and citations, academic course offerings, or discipline-wide awards—
econometrics dominates experiments. This is especially true in tying cases. Although they 
are distinct approaches, an approximation about the use of experiments in tying cases may 
be drawn from a similar examination of behavioral economics in antitrust generally; a 2007 
paper by Maurice Stucke shows that no federal court has cited behavioral economic 
evidence in any antitrust case.134 On the other hand, the use of econometrics is well-
established, especially in antitrust. As Jonathan Baker notes, econometrics is so common 
that the Federal Judicial Center’s Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence has a chapter 
solely devoted to multiple regression.135 
While econometrics may currently be the generally accepted method, it is important 
to note that general acceptance is variable; future economists could come to prefer 
experiments, institutional case studies, etc. For example, two institutional economists won 
the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economics, and the 2010 John Bates Clark medal went to an 
economist for her work with field experiments. Charles Plott, an experimentalist, is 
optimistic regarding the popularity of economic experiments: “the [economics] profession 
has tasted the devil’s brew, the use of experimental methods, and likes it.”136 There is 
reason to believe that the recent growth in experimental economics will continue, both 
because of internal factors—economists becoming familiar with experimental methods, and 
experimentalists becoming more aware of their methodology—and also because of external 
factors—increasing availability of laboratory test equipment, and test subjects becoming 
more familiar with computers and digital transactions. 
At least at this point in time, however, it is clear that industrial organization, as well 
as economics generally, remains a non-experimental discipline. The general acceptance test 
articulated in Frye and Daubert, therefore, provides one reason to prefer econometric 
evidence in tying cases. 
 
B. External Validity 
  
Although general acceptance provides one reason to prefer econometric evidence, 
there are two reasons to go beyond this single criterion. First, Justice Blackmun explicitly 
warned against relying solely on the criteria in Daubert.137 Second, by calling judges the 
                                                
134 Maurice E. Stucke, “Behavioral Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the 21st Century,” The University 
of Tennessee College of Law Legal Studies Research paper series #12 December 2007, 515. 
135 Baker, 387. 
136 Charles R. Plott, “Will Economics Become an Experimental Science?” Southern Economic Journal, 
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“gatekeepers” of scientific evidence, Daubert meant to make judges less deferential to 
scientific communities.138 A preference for econometric evidence, therefore, should be 
based on more than just general acceptance. To what other criteria, then, should judges 
look? 
 One possibility is to look at the general debates about econometric and experimental 
methodology. For example, Vernon Smith, who won the Nobel Prize in 2002, criticizes 
Milton Friedman’s methodology of instrumentalism. Smith argues that Friedman’s 
methodology ignores the need to explain inaccurate predictions.139 While Smith’s argument 
may hold in the academic sphere, it is inconsistent with the view of economics as a tool in 
the legal sphere. Here again, the goal of prediction in the legal sphere does not necessarily 
align with the twin goals of prediction and explanation in the academic sphere. But more 
fundamentally, Friedman is not opposed to testing economic theories by experiments. 
Friedman’s essay emphasizes testing predictions by empirical means, and he simply does 
not think that economics is experimental.140 When he wrote his essay, 1953, Friedman’s 
lack of faith in experimental economics was justified; the first economic experiments had 
been run only five years earlier. So while there are differences between prominent 
econometric and experimental methodologists, these general differences will not help us 
distinguish between the two approaches in tying cases. 
 A second possibility is to elaborate on some criticisms about using paid economic 
experts in litigation.141 For example, the short time frame of the legal process and the 
significant compensation may skew the results of the testimony given by economic experts. 
These criticisms, however, would likely apply equally to both econometric and 
experimental experts. In general, it is unclear if an econometric study in a tying case would 
be more thorough than an experimental study, or vice versa, and much would dependent on 
case-specific data availability and legal discovery. Regardless, it would be improper to 
conclude that one empirical approach is categorically preferable based on the problems 
inherent to using expert testimony in litigation cases. 
  A third possibility, the ideal approach, would be to measure the predictive accuracy 
of econometric studies in tying cases, as compared to the predictive accuracy of 
experimental studies in tying cases. Remember that in tying cases, the judge uses economic 
evidence to make predictions about which ruling will maximize allocative efficiency. The 
reliability of economic evidence—that is, the predictive accuracy of the evidence—is 
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paramount. A measure of predictive accuracy, both for econometrics and experiments, 
therefore, would be a crucial criterion in deciding which approach to prefer. 
 Such a measure of predictive accuracy, however, is problematic for two reasons. 
First, experiments have never been used in tying cases. We could measure the predictive 
accuracy of econometrics in tying cases, but without a measure of experimental predictive 
accuracy, we cannot make a valid comparison. It is feasible that such a comparison will be 
possible in the future, say if courts start using experimental evidence in tying cases. This 
scenario is also problematic, however, because it turns the legal system into a laboratory to 
test the two different approaches. While we could feasibly compare the predictive accuracy 
of the two approaches in the future, such a social experiment would be morally-dubious, 
especially given the potential consequences for the immediate parties in the tying cases that 
use the less accurate approach. 
 The problem, therefore, remains: if predictive accuracy is the ideal criterion, but we 
cannot measure predictive accuracy, why should judges prefer econometric over 
experimental evidence?  The answer lies in a more thorough examination of experimental 
methodology. Specifically, judges need to understand the concept of external validity142 and 
why econometric evidence is more externally valid than experimental evidence. External 
validity, therefore, when combined with general acceptance, gives judges sufficient reason 
to prefer econometric evidence over experimental evidence. 
 External validity asks whether the sample (i.e. the laboratory test or the historical 
data set) accurately represents the “real world.” If a sample is externally valid, then the 
conclusions drawn from the sample can be confidently generalized to the population. In 
tying cases, this means that the conclusions presented in the courtroom generalize to the 
relevant market in question. As Francesco Guala writes, “[M]ost economists are not 
particularly interested in what happens when a group of undergraduate students play lottery 
games. They would like to learn something about the functioning of markets, about 
economic behavior in the real world.”143 
In sum, an instrumentalist conception of economic evidence does not allow us to 
distinguish between experimental and econometric evidence because we do not have the 
data to compare the two approaches. Instead, we must take a more thorough look at the 
methodology for each approach in order to decide which approach is more likely to produce 
conclusions that generalize to the real-world market in question. To make my conclusions 
more specific to tying law, I will break external validity into two parts, wholism and 
replication, and show how experimental evidence is deficient in these two areas. 
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1. Wholism 
  
For a study to be externally valid, the data in the sample must accurately represent 
the transactions carried out in the relevant market. This means asking the question: does 
being in a laboratory alter the way people act? If so, the experiment is not externally valid. 
A discontinuity between laboratory and real-world behavior is a prevalent concern for 
social science experiments and is generally known as the Hawthorne effect.144 
 The Hawthorne effect is a specific name for a wholistic critique. Wholism is the 
principle that a part—in tying studies, an economic agent—cannot be understood 
independently of the whole—the market. Wholism essentially says that there are some 
characteristics inherent to real-world markets that are lost if data is taken out of the context 
of the market. From a wholistic perspective, testing economic theory requires sample data 
that accurately represents the population. 
 At this abstract level, wholism is an unattainable standard; economists obviously 
need to narrow their focus somewhat to make economic questions coherent and 
manageable. When considering evidence in tying law, however, we can use the concept of 
wholism to motivate a comparison between econometrics and experiments. With laboratory 
testing, there is a trade-off between wholism and control, a trade-off between data 
generation and data accumulation. While econometric data is accumulated from the relevant 
market, experimental data is generated in the laboratory. As Talley notes, “Notably, both 
[econometrics]145 and experimentalism use accepted statistical techniques both to 
summarize data and to test hypotheses. Their core distinction comes from the distinct 
underlying sources of that data.”146 Experimental data, therefore, is more susceptible to a 
wholistic critique. 
 Before detailing the problems with experimental data, it is important to keep in 
mind the scope of this paper. Data generation is often considered an important advantage of 
experimental economics in general; unlike econometricians, experimentalists never suffer 
from an incomplete or lacking data set. One could argue, therefore, that even if 
experimental economics is less wholistic than econometrics, it is necessary to make 
empirical conclusions. While this argument is valid, it is not applicable to evidence in tying 
cases.  
The econometric data in legal cases is often richer than in academic studies because 
antitrust enforcement agencies have the clout and private parties have the incentive to 
accumulate the most complete data sets.147 Also, as set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil 
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Procedure, the legal process of discovery requires that all parties disclose essential 
documents and data sets.148 Baker also argues that the use of qualitative data and the goals 
of litigation econometrics make legal studies more reliable than academic studies.149 In 
tying cases, therefore, finding relevant historical data is unlikely to be a problem, rendering 
one significant criticism of econometrics void. 
 To clarify the wholistic criticism of experimental data and to apply it to tying 
arrangements, consider the experiments run by Caliskan, et al.150 There are five reasons to 
be skeptical about the laboratory sample’s wholistic validity. While these five criticisms 
could be elaborated further, I’ll only give an example from the laboratory experiment to 
clarify each criticism.  
First, the composition of the data set. The human subjects in the experiment were 
students at George Mason University, and they all signed up to be involved in the economic 
experiment. The economic actors, therefore, were all college-educated and more likely to 
have economics training. In the experiment, furthermore, the students acted as the 
producers, which adds another layer of discontinuity between the market and the laboratory. 
Second, the incentives of the laboratory do not mirror the market. The average payout was 
$25.36 per student, significantly less than actual payout for firm employees. 
 Third, the experiment imposed informational controls in the experiment that are 
unlikely to occur in the market. For example, the subjects were given no information on 
demand, while a real-world firm will likely have data about its customers and their buying 
habits. Fourth, the experiment imposed assumptions about market structure, namely that 
demand was computerized to maximize consumer welfare. Computerized demand, although 
reasonable given the scope of the experiment, is still an artificial assumption that may or 
may not hold in the actual market. Finally, the experiment lasted only two hours, which 
raises questions about heuristics. An experiment must strike a balance of time so that 
subjects can learn from mistakes, but it seems that a real-world actor may put considerably 
more time into pricing decisions. 
 Initially, these five wholistic criticisms about experiments seem to echo the 
criticisms about realistic assumptions of economic models. Instrumentalism, by arguing that 
we look predictions and not assumptions, is supposed to answer these concerns. But 
remember that it is impossible to compare the predictive accuracy of experiments and 
econometrics. A more thorough critique of experimental methodology, therefore, does not 
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conflict with my defense of instrumentalism earlier in this paper; an additional examination 
of methodological assumptions is necessary to separate experiments and econometrics. 
In sum, the drawbacks of data generation—composition, incentives, information, 
heuristics, market structure—are tolerable in many experimental studies simply because the 
necessary econometric data is unavailable. In tying cases, however, econometric data is 
available, so a reliance on generated data instead becomes a problem for experimental 
evidence; what the laboratory-generated data gains in availability, it sacrifices in 
authenticity. The disadvantages of data generation, therefore, make experimental evidence 
less externally valid than econometric evidence. 
 
2. Replication 
  
In addition to asking whether the sample data are authentic, it is important to ask 
whether the sample data are comprehensive enough to draw conclusions from. Like data 
generation, replication is often considered an advantage of experimental economics; the 
conclusions in one experiment can be repeated for different samples to determine how 
robust the conclusions are. Just as with data generation, however, what is an advantage for 
experiments generally does not translate to experiments as evidence in tying cases.  
 Consider the tying experiment in Caliskan, et al., in which the experiment was 
conducted using 20 undergraduate students. While 20 subjects may seem like a small 
number, experimentalists are quick to argue that replication of an experiment will expand 
the sample size so that, at some point, the sample size will be sufficiently large. 
Experimentalists also note that tests of external validity, even with small sample sizes, show 
there is no cause for concern. As Al Roth notes, “Do college students behave like real 
people?... you can never be sure. But for most purposes there is little evidence that they do 
not, since results initially obtained with college students seem to be robust more often than 
not.”151 While there is some evidence that test subjects perform the same as real-world 
actors,152 these tests are not specific to tying studies or even to antitrust in general. 
 The reason that experimental replication is especially invalid in tying law is that 
tying cases require case-specific market analysis. The consequences of tying arrangements 
are case-specific and subject to fluctuation if minute details change. For example, the 
difference between the single-monopoly-profit theorem and the leverage theory of tying is 
based on the initial assumptions. Merely by assuming scale economies instead of constant 
returns-to-scale, it can be shown theoretically that a tying arrangement will be 
anticompetitive.  
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 Within the academic sphere, the theoretical and econometric literature on the 
various market conditions is extensive, but still far from exhaustive.153 Experimental tests of 
tying arrangements in various market conditions is even less extensive. Just within the 
academic sphere, therefore, the promise of replication has not held. When examined within 
the legal sphere, replicable is even less useful.  
The rationale for judging tying cases according to the rule of reason is that tying 
arrangements are extremely sensitive to market conditions. A slight change in market 
conditions may lead to entirely different consequences, yet experiments rely on time-
consuming replication in order to be considered externally valid. If an experiment is to be 
used as evidence in a tying case, it must both be case-specific and delivered within a 
relatively short timeframe. This is an intractable situation for an approach that relies on 
replication for externally valid results. The relatively short term of a lawsuit and the finality 
of a judge’s ruling means that a case-specific experiment cannot be adequately replicated. 
Because experimental conclusions will necessarily rely on the actions of around 20 self-
selected subjects, it is untenable to defend the experiment’s conclusions as externally valid. 
 The criticisms of wholism and replication in experiments, though they provide a 
rationale to reject experimental evidence, do not obviate the problems in econometric 
studies. Even when an econometrician gets past data accumulation and model specification, 
there are still two prominent problems with using econometric evidence. The first problem, 
termed the signal-to-noise ratio by G.M. Peter Swann, regards the noise in explanatory 
variables caused by measurement error.154 Swann argues that this ratio becomes more 
problematic as more explanatory variables are added to the equation, thus creating a trade-
off between omitted-variable bias and signal-to-noise ratio.155 Such a problem has not been 
adequately addressed by econometric methodologists,156 which creates concerns about the 
validity of econometric evidence. 
 Second, even if an econometric studies is thorough, the principles of statistical 
testing only generate probable causal links: As Daniel Rubinfeld states, then addresses, the 
problem, “There is a tension between any attempt to reach conclusions with near certainty 
and the inherently probabilistic nature of multiple regression analysis…The reality that 
statistical analysis generates probabilities that there are relationships should not be seen in 
itself as an argument against the use of statistical evidence. The only alternative might be to 
use less reliable anecdotal evidence.”157 This criticism is also answered by the instrumental 
framework laid out in Part I: certainty is too high a threshold for evidence in tying cases, so 
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judges should be examining usefulness. As William James said, “All our decisions are bets 
on what the universe is today, and what it will do tomorrow.”158 
Despite the problems of signal-to-noise and probabilistic causes, econometrics is 
still preferable to experimental evidence. The basic reason is that empiricism is the 
foundation of science, and data objectivity is the foundation of empiricism.159 By showing 
that econometric data is more externally valid—and thereby more objective—than 
experimental data, therefore, judges have a rationale for preferring econometric data in 
tying cases, despite its imperfections.   
The concerns associated with external validity are a constant problem for 
experimental economics generally. As Loewenstein argues, “[E]xperiments have high 
external validity if they are intended to represent the behaviour, and consequences of that 
behaviour, of people operating in highly structured markets. They are much less well suited 
for testing predictions about the economic consequences of individual behaviour in the 'real 
world.'”160 Doubts about the external validity of experiments become even more pressing 
when we consider their use as evidence in tying cases.  
First, econometric evidence is more abundant in the legal sphere than in the 
academic sphere, so that data generation in experiments becomes a glaring disadvantage. 
Second, the need to evaluate tying cases individually according to case-specific market 
conditions make the experimental defense of replication ineffective. In tying cases, 
therefore, econometric evidence is more externally valid than experimental evidence, giving 
judges a sufficient rationale to prefer econometrics. Despite the problems associated with 
econometric studies tying cases, it is the best approach for judges to use when ruling on the 
legality of tying arrangements. Keeping with the intellectual humility emphasized by 
fallibilism, judges should reject experimental evidence and fail to reject econometric 
evidence. 
 
Conclusion 
 
For the rational study of law the black-letter man may be the man of the present, but the man of the 
future is the man of statistics and the master of economics. 
-Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes161 
 
Understanding the scope of this paper is essential to evaluating its conclusions. 
While I conclude that judges should prefer econometric evidence in tying cases, this 
conclusion may not generalize to economic evidence in other areas of law and certainly 
does not generalize to the entire economics profession. This paper examines the 
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gatekeeping role of a judge within a specific area of law, and my conclusions need to be 
evaluated within that scope. 
The consequentialist framework in Part I relies on the unique characteristics of 
antitrust law and of economic evidence in the courtroom. The well-established goal of 
allocative effiency makes legal pragmatism effective in tying cases, but its efficacy as a 
comprehensive jurisprudence is left unanswered. Whether judges should be legal 
pragmatists in tax law or tort law requires additional examination. Likewise, my arguments 
about economic instrumentalism rely on the courts’ use of economics as a tool of prediction 
and do not generalize to all economic studies. For economics to grow as a science, 
economists should be encouraged to make use of a wide range of approaches, especially 
purely theoretical and experimental studies. The legal and academic spheres are distinct, 
and what is considered scientific evidence in tying cases may not correspond to scientific 
evidence for academic journals. 
Furthermore, the distinctive characteristics of tying arrangements influence my 
conclusions. For example, the anti-competitive and efficiency consequences of tying 
arrangements makes empirical approaches preferable, and the variation of consequences 
with case-specific market conditions favors econometric evidence. The exposition of my 
conclusions in Parts III and IV, therefore, also need to be evaluated within the scope of 
tying law. 
My goal in this paper is not to present a general theory of economic evidence, but to 
explain how a judge can discharge his responsibility as a gatekeeper of scientific evidence 
in tying cases. Contrary to Justice William Rehnquist’s caution, a judge need not be an 
amateur scientist in order to discharge his responsibility as a gatekeeper of scientific 
evidence in tying cases.162 With vigilance at the gates of empiricism, judges can realize the 
capacity of economic science: “[T]o reach knowledge of the law of phenomena, so as to 
foresee, vary or master phenomena.”163 
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